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ABSTRACT
Rising concern for the societal implications of artificial intelligence
systems has inspired a wave of academic and journalistic literature
in which deployed systems are audited for harm by investigators
from outside the organizations deploying the algorithms. However,
it remains challenging for practitioners to identify the harmful
repercussions of their own systems prior to deployment, and, once
deployed, emergent issues can become difficult or impossible to
trace back to their source.
In this paper, we introduce a framework for algorithmic auditing
that supports artificial intelligence system development end-to-end,
to be applied throughout the internal organization development life-
cycle. Each stage of the audit yields a set of documents that together
form an overall audit report, drawing on an organization’s values
or principles to assess the fit of decisions made throughout the pro-
cess. The proposed auditing framework is intended to contribute to
closing the accountability gap in the development and deployment
of large-scale artificial intelligence systems by embedding a robust
process to ensure audit integrity.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Social andprofessional topics→ Systemmanagement;Tech-
nology audits; • Software and its engineering→ Software de-
velopment process management.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the increased access to artificial intelligence (AI) development
tools and Internet-sourced datasets, corporations, nonprofits and
governments are deploying AI systems at an unprecedented pace,
often in massive-scale production systems impacting millions if not
billions of users [1]. In the midst of this widespread deployment,
however, come valid concerns about the effectiveness of these auto-
mated systems for the full scope of users, and especially a critique
of systems that have the propensity to replicate, reinforce or am-
plify harmful existing social biases [8, 37, 62]. External audits are
designed to identify these risks from outside the system and serve
as accountability measures for these deployed models. However,
such audits tend to be conducted after model deployment, when
the system has already negatively impacted users [26, 51].
In this paper, we present internal algorithmic audits as a mecha-
nism to check that the engineering processes involved in AI system
creation and deployment meet declared ethical expectations and
standards, such as organizational AI principles. The audit process is
necessarily boring, slow, meticulous and methodical—antithetical
to the typical rapid development pace for AI technology. However,
it is critical to slow down as algorithms continue to be deployed
in increasingly high-stakes domains. By considering historical ex-
amples across industries, we make the case that such audits can be
leveraged to anticipate potential negative consequences before they
occur, in addition to providing decision support to design mitiga-
tions, more clearly defining and monitoring potentially adverse out-
comes, and anticipating harmful feedback loops and system-level
risks [20]. Executed by a dedicated team of organization employees,
internal audits operate within the product development context and
can inform the ultimate decision to abandon the development of
AI technology when the risks outweigh the benefits (see Figure 1).
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Inspired from the practices and artifacts of several disciplines, we
go further to develop SMACTR, a defined internal audit framework
meant to guide practical implementations. Our framework strives
to establish interdisciplinarity as a default in audit and engineering
processes while providing the much needed structure to support
the conscious development of AI systems.
2 GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND
AUDITS
We use accountability to mean the state of being responsible or
answerable for a system, its behavior and its potential impacts [38].
Although algorithms themselves cannot be held accountable as they
are not moral or legal agents [7], the organizations designing and
deploying algorithms can through governance structures. Proposed
standard ISO 37000 defines this structure as "the system by which
the whole organization is directed, controlled and held accountable
to achieve its core purpose over the long term."1 If the responsible
development of artificial intelligence is a core purpose of organiza-
tions creating AI, then a governance system by which the whole
organization is held accountable should be established.
1https://committee.iso.org/sites/tc309/home/projects/ongoing/ongoing-1.html
Figure 1: High-level overview of the context of an internal
algorithmic audit. The audit is conducted during product
development and prior to launch. The audit team leads the
product team, management and other stakeholders in con-
tributing to the audit. Policies and principles, including in-
ternal and external ethical expectations, also feed into the
audit to set the standard for performance.
In environmental studies, Lynch and Veland [45] introduced
the concept of urgent governance, distinguishing between audit-
ing for system reliability vs societal harm. For example, a power
plant can be consistently productive while causing harm to the
environment through pollution [42]. Similarly, an AI system can
be found technically reliable and functional through a traditional
engineering quality assurance pipeline without meeting declared
ethical expectations. A separate governance structure is necessary
for the evaluation of these systems for ethical compliance. This
evaluation can be embedded in the established quality assurance
workflow but serves a different purpose, evaluating and optimizing
for a different goal centered on social benefits and values rather
than typical performance metrics such as accuracy or profit [39].
Although concerns about reliability are related, and although prac-
tices for testing production AI systems are established for industry
practitioners [4], issues involving social impact, downstream ef-
fects in critical domains, and ethics and fairness concerns are not
typically covered by concepts such as technical debt and reliability
engineering.
2.1 What is an audit?
Audits are tools for interrogating complex processes, often to deter-
minewhether they complywith company policy, industry standards
or regulations [43]. The IEEE standard for software development
defines an audit as “an independent evaluation of conformance of
software products and processes to applicable regulations, stan-
dards, guidelines, plans, specifications, and procedures” [32]. Build-
ing from methods of external auditing in investigative journalism
and research [17, 62, 65], algorithmic auditing has started to become
similar in spirit to the well-established practice of bug bounties,
where external hackers are paid for finding vulnerabilities and bugs
in released software [46]. These audits, modeled after intervention
strategies in information security and finance [62], have signifi-
cantly increased public awareness of algorithmic accountability.
An external audit of automated facial analysis systems exposed
high disparities in error rates among darker-skinned women and
lighter-skinned men [8], showing how structural racism and sexism
can be encoded and reinforced through AI systems. [8] reveals
interaction failures, in which the production and deployment of an
AI system interacts with unjust social structures to contribute to
biased predictions, as Safiya Noble has described [54]. Such findings
demonstrate the need for companies to understand the social and
power dynamics of their deployed systems’ environments, and
record such insights to manage their products’ impact.
2.2 AI Principles as Customized Ethical
Standards
According to Mittelstadt [49], at least 63 public-private initiatives
have produced statements describing high-level principles, values
and other tenets to guide the ethical development, deployment
and governance of AI. Important values such as ensuring AI tech-
nologies are subject to human direction and control, and avoiding
the creation or reinforcement of unfair bias, have been included
in many organizations’ ethical charters. However, the AI industry
lacks proven methods to translate principles into practice [49], and
AI principles have been criticized for being vague and providing
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little to no means of accountability [27, 82]. Nevertheless, such
principles are becoming common methods to define the ethical
priorities of an organization and thus the operational goals for
which to aim [34, 83]. Thus, in the absence of more formalized and
universal standards, they can be used as a North Star to guide the
evaluation of the development lifecycle, and internal audits can
investigate alignment with declared AI principles prior to model
deployment. We propose a framing of risk analyses centered on
the failure to achieve AI principle objectives, outlining an audit
practice that can begin translating ethical principles into practice.
2.3 Audit Integrity and Procedural Justice
Audit results are at times approached with skepticism since they are
reliant on and vulnerable to human judgment. To establish the in-
tegrity of the audit itself as an independently valid result, the audit
must adhere to the proper execution of an established audit pro-
cess. This is a repeatedly observed phenomenon in tax compliance
auditing, where several international surveys of tax compliance
demonstrate that a fixed and vetted tax audit methodology is one
of the most effective strategies to convince companies to respect
audit results and pay their full taxes [22, 53].
Procedural justice implies the legitimacy of an outcome due to
the admission of a fair and thorough process. Establishing proce-
dural justice to increase compliance is thus a motivating factor
for establishing common and robust frameworks through which
independent audits can demonstrate adherence to standards. In ad-
dition, audit integrity is best established when auditors themselves
live up to an ethical standard, vetted by adherence to an expected
code of conduct or norm in how the audit is to be conducted. In
finance, for example, it became clear that any sense of dishonesty
or non-transparency in audit methodology would lead audit targets
to dismiss rather than act on results [66].
2.4 The Internal Audit
External auditing, in which companies are accountable to a third
party [62], are fundamentally limited by lack of access to internal
processes at the audited organizations. Although external audits
conducted by credible experts are less affected by organization-
internal considerations, external auditors can only access model
outputs, for example by using an API [65]. Auditors do not have
access to intermediate models or training data, which are often
protected as trade secrets [9]. Internal auditors’ direct access to sys-
tems can thus help extend traditional external auditing paradigms
by incorporating additional information typically unavailable for
external evaluations to reveal previously unidentifiable risks.
The goals of an internal audit are similar to quality assurance,
with the objective to enrich, update or validate the risk analysis
for product deployment. Internal audits aim to evaluate how well
the product candidate, once in real-world operation, will fit the
expected system behaviour encoded in standards.
A modification in objective from a post-deployment audit to
pre-deployment audit applied throughout the development process
enables proactive ethical intervention methods, rather than simply
informing reactive measures only implementable after deployment,
as is the case with a purely external approach. Because there is
an increased level of system access in an internal audit, identified
gaps in performance or processes can be mapped to sociotechnical
considerations that should be addressed through joint efforts with
product teams. As the audit results can lead to ambiguous conclu-
sions, it is critical to identify key stakeholders and decision makers
who can drive appropriate responses to audit outcomes.
Additionally, with an internal audit, because auditors are em-
ployees of the organization and communicate their findings pri-
marily to an internal audience, there is opportunity to leverage
these audit outcomes for recommendations of structural organiza-
tional changes needed to make the entire engineering development
process auditable and aligned with ethical standards. Ultimately,
internal audits complement external accountability, generating ar-
tifacts or transparent information [70] that third parties can use for
external auditing, or even end-user communication. Internal audits
can thus enable review and scrutiny from additional stakeholders,
by enforcing transparency through stricter reporting requirements.
3 LESSONS FROM AUDITING PRACTICES IN
OTHER INDUSTRIES
Improving the governance of artificial intelligence development
is intended to reduce the risks posed by new technology. While
not without faults, safety-critical and regulated industries such as
aerospace and medicine have long traditions of auditable processes
and design controls that have dramatically improved safety [77, 81].
3.1 Aerospace
Globally, there is one commercial airline accident per two million
flights [63]. This remarkable safety record is the result of a joint and
concerted effort over many years by aircraft and engine manufac-
turers, airlines, governments, regulatory bodies, and other industry
stakeholders [63]. As modern avionic systems have increased in size
and complexity (for example, the Boeing 787 software is estimated
at 13 million lines of code [35]), the standard 1-in-1,000,000,000
per use hour maximum failure probability for critical aerospace
systems remains an underappreciated engineering marvel [19].
However, as the recent Boeing 737MAX accidents indicate, safety
is never finished, and the qualitative impact of failures cannot be
ignored—even one accident can impact the lives of many and is
rightfully acknowledged as a catastrophic tragedy. Complex sys-
tems tend to drift toward unsafe conditions unless constant vigi-
lance is maintained [42]. It is the sum of the tiny probabilities of
individual events that matters in complex systems—if this grows
without bound, the probability of catastrophe goes to one. The
Borel-Cantelli Lemmas are formalizations of this statistical phenom-
enon [13], which means that we can never be satisfied with safety
standards. Additionally, standards can be compromised if compet-
ing business interests take precedence. Because the non-zero risk of
failure grows over time, without continuous active measures being
developed to mitigate risk, disaster becomes inevitable [29].
3.1.1 Design checklists. Checklists are simple tools for assisting
designers in having a more informed view of important questions,
edge cases and failures [30]. Checklists are widely used in aerospace
for their proven ability to improve safety and designs. There are
several cautions about using checklists during the development of
complex software, such as the risk of blind application, the broader
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context and nuanced interrelated concerns are not considered. How-
ever, a checklist can be beneficial. It is good practice to avoid yes/no
questions to reduce the risk that the checklist becomes a box-ticking
activity, for example by asking designers and engineers to describe
their processes for assessing ethical risk. Checklist use should also
be related to real-world failures and higher-level system hazards.
3.1.2 Traceability. Another key concept from aerospace and safety-
critical software engineering is traceability—which is concerned
with the relationships between product requirements, their sources
and system design. This practice is familiar to the software industry
in requirements engineering [2]. However, in AI research, it can
often be difficult to trace the provenance of large datasets or to inter-
pret the meaning of model weights—to say nothing of the challenge
of understanding how these might relate to system requirements.
Additionally, as the complexity of sociotechnical systems is rapidly
increasing, and as the speed and complexity of large-scale artificial
intelligence systems increase, new approaches are necessary to
understand risk [42].
3.1.3 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. Finally, a standard tool in
safety engineering is a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA),
methodical and systematic risk management approach that exam-
ines a proposed design or technology for foreseeable failures [72].
The main purpose of a FMEA is to define, identify and eliminate
potential failures or problems in different products, designs, sys-
tems and services. Prior to conducting a FMEA, known issues with
a proposed technology should be thoroughly mapped through a
literature review and by collecting and documenting the experi-
ences of the product designers, engineers and managers. Further,
the risk exercise is based on known issues with relevant datasets
and models, information that can be gathered from interviews and
from extant technical documentation.
FMEAs can help designers improve or upgrade their products to
reduce risk of failure. They can also help decision makers formulate
corresponding preventive measures or improve reactive strategies
in the event of post-launch failure. FMEAs are widely used in many
fields including aerospace, chemical engineering, design, mechani-
cal engineering and medical devices. To our knowledge, however,
the FMEA method has not been applied to examine ethical risks in
production-scale artificial intelligence models or products.
3.2 Medical devices
Internal and external quality assurance audits are a daily occurrence
in the pharmaceutical and medical device industry. Audit document
trails are as important as the drug products and devices themselves.
The history of quality assurance audits in medical devices dates
from several medical disasters in which devices, such as infusion
pumps and autoinjectors, failed or were used improperly [80].
3.2.1 Design Controls. For medical devices, the stages of prod-
uct development are strictly defined. In fact, federal law (Code of
Federal Regulations Title 21) mandates that medical-device mak-
ers establish and maintain “design control” procedures to ensure
that design requirements are met and designs and development
processes are auditable. Practically speaking, design controls are a
documented method of ensuring that the end product matches the
intended use, and that potential risks from using the technology
have been anticipated and mitigated [77]. The purpose is to ensure
that anticipated risks related to the use of technology are driven
down to the lowest degree that is reasonably practicable.
3.2.2 Intended Use. Medical-device makers must maintain proce-
dures to ensure that design requirements meet the “intended use”
of the device. The intended use of a “device” (or, increasingly in
medicine, an algorithm—see [60] for more) determines the level of
design control required: for example, a tongue depressor (a simple
piece of wood) is the lowest class of risk (Class I), while a deep
brain implant would be the highest (Class III). The intended use
of a tongue depressor could be “to displace the tongue to facilitate
examination of the surrounding organs and tissues”, differentiating
a tongue depressor from a Popsicle stick. This may be important
when considering an algorithm that can be used to identify cats or
to identify tumors; depending on its intended use, the same algo-
rithm might have drastically different risk profiles, and additional
risks arise from unintended uses of the technology.
3.2.3 Design History File. For products classified as medical de-
vices, at every stage of the development process, device makers
must document the design input, output, review, verification, vali-
dation, transfer and changes—the design control process (section
3.2.1). Evidence that medical device designers and manufacturers
have followed design controls must be kept in a design history
file (DHF), which must be an accurate representation and docu-
mentation of the product and its development process. Included
in the DHF is an extensive risk assessment and hazard analysis,
which must be continuously updated as new risks are discovered.
Companies also proactively maintain “post-market surveillance”
for any issues that may arise with safety of a medical device.
3.2.4 Structural Vulnerability. In medicine there is a deep acknowl-
edgement of socially determinant factors in healthcare access and
effectiveness, and an awareness of the social biases influencing
the dynamic of prescriptions and treatments. This widespread ac-
knowledgement led to the framework of operationalizing structural
vulnerability in healthcare contexts, and effectively the design of
an assessment tool to record the anticipated social conditions sur-
rounding a particular remedy or medical recommendation [61].
Artificial intelligence models are equally subject to social influence
and social impact, and undergoing such assessments on more holis-
tic and population- or environment-based considerations is relevant
to algorithmic auditing.
3.3 Finance
As automated accounting systems started to appear in the 1950s,
corporate auditors continued to rely on manual procedures to audit
“around the computer”. In the 1970s, the Equity Funding Corpora-
tion scandal and the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
spurred companies to more thoroughly integrate internal controls
throughout their accounting systems. This heightened the need to
audit these systems directly. The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act intro-
duced sweeping changes to the profession in demanding greater
focus on financial reporting and fraud detection [10].
Financial auditing had to play catch-up as the complexity and
automation of financial business practices became too unwieldy to
managemanually. Stakeholders in large companies and government
Closing the AI Accountability Gap:
Defining an End-to-End Framework for Internal Algorithmic Auditing FAT* ’20, January 27–30, 2020, Barcelona, Spain
regulators desired a way to hold companies accountable. Concerns
among regulators and shareholders that the managers in large
financial firms would squander profits from newly created financial
instruments prompted the development of financial audits [74].
Additionally, as financial transactions and markets became more
automated, abstract and opaque, threats to social and economic val-
ues were answered increasingly with audits. But financial auditing
lagged behind the process of technology-enabled financialization
of markets and firms.
3.3.1 Audit Infrastructure. In general, internal financial audits seek
assurance that the organization has a formal governance process
that is operating as intended: values and goals are established and
communicated, the accomplishment of goals is monitored, account-
ability is ensured and values are preserved. Further, internal audits
seek to find out whether significant risks within the organization
are being managed and controlled to an acceptable level [71].
Internal financial auditors typically have unfettered access to
necessary information, people, records and outsourced operations
across the organization. IIA Performance Standard 2300, Performing
the Engagement [55], states that internal auditors should identify,
analyze, evaluate and record sufficient information to achieve the
audit objectives. The head of internal audit determines how internal
auditors carry out their work and the level of evidence required to
support their conclusions.
3.4 Discussion and Challenges
The lessons from other industries above are a useful guide toward
building internal accountability to society as a stakeholder. Yet,
there are many novel and unique aspects of artificial intelligence
development that present urgent research challenges to overcome.
Current software development practice in general, and arti-
ficial intelligence development in particular, does not typically
follow the waterfall or verification-and-validation approach [16].
These approaches are still used, in combination with agile methods,
in the above-mentioned industries because they are much more
documentation-oriented, auditable and requirements-driven. Agile
artificial intelligence development is much faster and iterative, and
thus presents a challenge to auditability. However, applying agile
methodologies to internal audits themselves is a current topic of
research in the internal audit profession.2
Most internal audit functions outside of heavily regulated indus-
tries tend to take a risk-based approach. They work with product
teams to ask "what could go wrong" at each step of a process and
use that to build a risk register [59]. This allows risks to rise to
the surface in a way that is informed by the people who know
these processes and systems the best. Internal audits can also lever-
age relevant experts from within the company to facilitate such
discussions and provide additional insight on potential risks [3].
Large-scale production AI systems are extraordinarily complex,
and a critical line of future research relates to addressing the inter-
action of highly complex coupled sociotechnical systems. Moreover,
there is a dynamic complex interaction between users as sources of
data, data collection, and model training and updating. Additionally,
governance processes based solely on risk have been criticized for
2https://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2018/08/06/mind-over-matter-
implementing-agile-internal-audit/
being unable to anticipate the most profound impacts from techno-
logical innovation, such as the financial crisis in 2008, in which big
data and algorithms played a large role [52, 54, 57].
With artificial intelligence systems it can be difficult to trace
model output back to requirements because these may not be ex-
plicitly documented, and issues may only become apparent once
systems are released. However, from an ethical and moral perspec-
tive it is incumbent on producers of artificial intelligence systems
to anticipate ethics-related failures before launch. However, as [58]
and [31] point out, the design, prototyping and maintenance of
AI systems raises many unique challenges not commonly faced
with other kinds of intelligent systems or computing systems more
broadly. For example, data entanglement results from the fact that
artificial intelligence is a tool that mixes data sources together. As
Scully et al. point out, artificial intelligence models create entangle-
ment andmake the isolation of improvements effectively impossible
[67], which they call Change Anything Change Everything. We sug-
gest that by having explicit documentation about the purpose, data,
and model space, potential hazards could be identified earlier in
the development process.
Selbst and Barocas argue that “one must seek explanations of
the process behind a model‘s development, not just explanations
of the model itself” [68]. As a relatively young community focused
on fairness, accountability, and transparency in AI, we have some
indication of the system culture requirements needed to normalize,
for example, an adequately thorough documentation procedure and
guidelines [24, 48]. Still, we lack the formalization of a standard
model development template or practice, or process guidelines for
when and in which contexts it is appropriate to implement certain
recommendations. In these cases, internal auditors can work with
engineering teams to construct the missing documentation to assess
practices against the scope of the audit. Improving documentation
can then be a remediation for future work.
Also, as AI is at times considered a “general purpose technology”
with multiple and dual uses [78], the lack of reliable standardization
poses significant challenges to governance efforts. This challenge
is compounded by increasing customization and variability of what
an AI product development lifecycle looks like depending on the
anticipated context of deployment or industry.
We thus combine learnings from prior practice in adjacent in-
dustries while recognizing the uniqueness of the commercial AI
industry to identify key opportunities for internal auditing in our
specific context. We do so in a way that is appropriate to the re-
quirements of an AI system.
4 SMACTR: AN INTERNAL AUDIT
FRAMEWORK
We now outline the components of an initial internal audit frame-
work, which can be framed as encompassing five distinct stages—
Scoping,Mapping, Artifact Collection, Testing and Reflection (SMACTR)—
all of which have their own set of documentation requirements and
account for a different level of the analysis of a system. Figure 2
illustrates the full set of artifacts recommended for each stage.
To illustrate the utility of this framework, we contextualize our
descriptions with the hypothetical example of Company X Inc.,
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Figure 2: Overview of Internal Audit Framework. Gray indicates a process, and the colored sections represent documents.
Documents in orange are produced by the auditors, blue documents are produced by the engineering and product teams and
green outputs are jointly developed.
a large multinational software engineering consulting firm, spe-
cializing in developing custom AI solutions for a diverse range of
clients. We imagine this company has designated five AI princi-
ples, paraphrased from the most commonly identified AI principles
in a current online English survey [34]–"Transparency", "Justice,
Fariness & Non-Discrimination", "Safety & Non-Maleficence", "Re-
sponsibility & Accountability" and "Privacy". We also assume that
the corporate structure of Company X is typical of any technical
consultancy, and design our stakeholder map by this assumption.
Company X has decided to pilot the SMACTR internal audit
framework to fulfill a corporate mandate towards responsible in-
novation practice, accommodate external accountability and op-
erationalize internal consistency with respect to its identified AI
principles. The fictional company thus pilots the audit framework
on two hypothetical client projects.
The first (hypothetical) client wishes to develop a child abuse
screening tool similar to that of the real cases extensively studied
and reported on [11, 14, 15, 21, 25, 36]. This complex case inter-
sects heavily with applications in high-risk scenarios with dire
consequences. This scenario demonstrates how, for algorithms in-
terfacing with high-risk contexts, a structured framework can allow
for the careful consideration of all the possibilities and risks with
taking on the project, and the extent of its understood social impact.
The second invented client is Happy-Go-Lucky, Inc., an imag-
ined photo service company looking for a smile detection algorithm
to automatically trigger the cameras in their installed physical
photo booths. In this scenario, the worst case is a lack of customer
satisfaction—the stakes are low and the situation seems relatively
straightforward. This scenario demonstrates how in even seem-
ingly simple and benign cases, ethical consideration of system
deployment can reveal underlying issues to be addressed prior to
deployment, especially when we contextualize the model within
the setting of the product and deployment environment.
An end-to-end worked example of the audit framework is avail-
able as supplementary material to this paper for the Happy-Go-
Lucky, Inc. client case. This includes demonstrative templates of
all recommended documentation, with the exception of specific
process files such as any experimental results, interview transcripts,
a design history file and the summary report. Workable templates
can also be accessed as an online resource here.
4.1 The Governance Process
To design our audit procedure, we suggest complementing formal
risk assessment methodologies with ideas from responsible innova-
tion, which stresses four key dimensions: anticipation, reflexivity,
inclusion and responsiveness [73], as well as system-theoretic con-
cepts that help grapple with increasing complexity and coupling
of artificial intelligence systems with the external world [42]. Risk-
based assessments can be limited in their ability to capture social
and ethical stakes, and they should be complemented by anticipa-
tory questions such as, “what if...?”. The aim is to increase ethical
foresight through systematic thinking about the larger sociotechni-
cal system in which a product will be deployed [50]. There are also
intersections between this framework and just effective product
development theory [5], as many of the components of audit de-
sign refocus the product development process to prioritize the user
and their ultimate well-being, resulting in a more effective product
performance outcome.
At a minimum, the internal audit process should enable critical
reflections on the potential impact of a system, serving as internal
education and training on ethical awareness in addition to leav-
ing what we refer to as a “transparency trail” of documentation at
each step of the development cycle (see Figure 2). To shift the pro-
cess into an actionable mechanism for accountability, we present a
validated and transparently outlined procedure that auditors can
commit to. The thoroughness of our described process will hope-
fully engage the trust of audit targets to act on and acknowledge
post-audit recommendations for engineering practices in alignment
with prescribed AI principles.
This process primarily addresses how to conduct internal audits,
providing guidance for those that have already deemed an audit
necessary but would like to further define the scope and execution
details. Though not covered here, an equally important process is
determining what systems to audit and why. Each industry has a
way to judge what requires a full audit, but that process is discre-
tionary and dependent on a range of contextual factors pertinent to
the industry, the organization, audit team resourcing, and the case
Closing the AI Accountability Gap:
Defining an End-to-End Framework for Internal Algorithmic Auditing FAT* ’20, January 27–30, 2020, Barcelona, Spain
at hand. Risk prioritization and the necessary variance in scrutiny
is a separately interesting and rich research topic on its own. The
process outlined below can be applied in full or in a lighter-weight
formulation, depending on the level of assessment desired.
4.2 The Scoping Stage
For both clients, a product or request document is provided to spec-
ify the requirements and expectations of the product or feature.
The goal of the scoping stage is to clarify the objective of the audit
by reviewing the motivations and intended impact of the inves-
tigated system, and confirming the principles and values meant
to guide product development. This is the stage in which the risk
analysis begins by mapping out intended use cases and identify-
ing analogous deployments either within the organization or from
competitors or adjacent industries. The goal is to anticipate areas
to investigate as potential sources of harm and social impact. At
this stage, interaction with the system should be minimal.
In the case of the smile-triggered phone booth, a smile detection
model is required, providing a simple product, with not a broad
scope of considerations as the potential for harm does not go much
beyond inconvenience or customer exclusion and dissatisfaction.
For the child abuse detection product, there are many more ap-
proaches to solving the issue and many more options for how the
model interacts with the broader system. The use case itself in-
volves many ethical considerations, as an ineffective model may
result in serious consequences like death or family separation.
The key artifacts developed by the auditors from this stage in-
clude an ethical review of the system use case and a social impact
assessment. Pre-requisite documents from the product and engi-
neering team should be a declaration or confirmation statement of
ethical objectives, standards and AI principles. The product team
should also provide a Product Requirements Document (PRD), or
project proposal from the initial planning of the audited product.
4.2.1 Artifact: Ethical Review of System Use Case. When a potential
AI system is in the development pipeline, it should be reviewed
with a series of questions that first and foremost check to see, at
a high level, whether the technology aligns with a set of ethical
values or principles. This can take the form of an ethical review that
considers the technology from a responsible innovation perspective
by asking who is likely to be impacted and how.
Importantly, we stress standpoint diversity in this process. Al-
gorithm development implicitly encodes developer assump-
tions that they may not be aware of, including ethical and
political values. Thus it is not always possible for individual tech-
nology workers to identify or assess their own biases or faulty
assumptions [33]. For this reason, a critical range of viewpoints is
included in the review process. The essential inclusion of indepen-
dent domain experts and marginalized groups in the ethical review
process "has the potential to lead to more rigorous critical reflection
because their experiences will often be precisely those that are most
needed in identifying problematic background assumptions and
revealing limitations with research questions, models, or method-
ologies" [33]. Another method to elicit implicit biases or motivated
cognition [40] is to ask people to reflect on their preliminary assess-
ment and then ask whether they might have reason to regret the
action later on. This can shed light on how our position in society
biases our assumptions and ways of knowing [18].
An internal ethics review board that includes a diversity of voices
should review proposed projects and document its views. Internal
ethics review boards are common in biomedical research, and the
purpose of these boards is to ensure that the rights, safety, and
well-being of all human subjects involved in medical research are
protected [56]. Similarly, the purpose of an ethics review board
for AI systems includes safeguarding human rights, safety, and
well-being of those potentially impacted.
4.2.2 Artifact: Social Impact Assessment. A social impact assess-
ment should inform the ethical review. Social impact assessments
are commonly defined as a method to analyze and mitigate the
unintended social consequences, both positive and negative, that
occur when a new development, program, or policy engages with
human populations and communities [79]. In it, we describe how
the use of an artificial intelligence system might change people’s
ways of life, their culture, their community, their political systems,
their environment, their health and well-being, their personal and
property rights, and their experiences (positive or negative) [79].
The social impact assessment includes two primary steps: an
assessment of the severity of the risks, and an identification of the
relevant social, economic, and cultural impacts and harms that an
artificial intelligence system applied in context may create. The
severity of risk is the degree to which the specific context of the
use case is assessed to determine the degree in which potential
harms may be amplified. The severity assessment proceeds from
the analysis of impacts and harms to give a sense of the relative
severity of the harms and impacts depending on the sensitivity,
constraints, and context of the use case.
4.3 The Mapping Stage
The mapping stage is not a step in which testing is actively done,
but rather a review of what is already in place and the perspectives
involved in the audited system. This is also the time to map internal
stakeholders, identify key collaborators for the execution of the
audit, and orchestrate the appropriate stakeholder buy-in required
for execution. At this stage, the FMEA (Section 3.1.3) should begin
and risks should be prioritized for later testing.
As Company X is a consultancy, this stage mainly requires iden-
tifying the stakeholders across product and engineering teams an-
chored to this particular client project, and recording the nature of
their involvement and contribution. This enables an internal record
of individual accountability with respect to participation towards
the final outcome, and enables the trace of relevant contacts for
future inquiry.
For the child abuse detection algorithm, the initial identification
of failure modes reveals the high stakes of the application, and
immediate threats to the "Safety &Non-Maleficence" principle. False
positives overwhelm staff and may lead to the separation of families
that could have recovered. False negatives may result in a dead or
injured child that could have been rescued. For the smile detector,
failures disproportionately impact those with alternative emotional
expressions—those with autism, different cultural norms on the
formality of smiling, or different expectations for the photograph
who are then excluded from the product by design.
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The key artifacts from this stage include a stakeholder map and
collaborator contact list, a system map of the product development
lifecycle, and the engineering system overview, especially in cases
where multiple models inform the end product. Additionally, this
stage includes a design history file review of all existing documen-
tation of the development process or historical artifacts on past
versions of the product. Finally, it includes a report or interview
transcripts on key findings from internal ethnographic fieldwork
involving the stakeholders and engineers.
4.3.1 Artifact: Stakeholder Map. Who was involved in the system
audit and collaborators in the execution of the audit should be out-
lined. Clarifying participant dynamics ensures a more transparent
representation of the provided information, giving further context
to the intended interpretation of the final audit report.
4.3.2 Artifact: Ethnographic Field Study. As Leveson points out,
bottom-up decentralized decision making can lead to failures in
complex sociotechnical systems [42]. Each local decision may be
correct in the limited context in which it was made, but can lead
to problems when these decisions and organizational behaviors
interact. With modern large-scale artificial intelligence projects and
API development, it can be difficult to gain a shared understanding
at the right level of system description to understand how local
decisions, such as the choice of dataset or model architecture, will
impact final system behavior.
Therefore, ethnography-inspired fieldwork methodology based
on how audits are conducted in other industries, such as finance
[74] and healthcare [64] is useful to get a deeper and qualitative
understanding of the engineering and product development pro-
cess. As in internal financial auditing, access to key people in the
organization is important. This access involves semi-structured
interviews with a range of individuals close to the development
process and documentation gathering to gain an understanding of
possible gaps that need to be examined more closely.
Traditional metrics for artificial intelligence like loss may con-
ceal fairness concerns, social impact risks or abstraction errors [69].
A key challenge is to assess how the numerical metrics specified
in the design of an artificial intelligence system reflect or conform
with these values. Metrics and measurement are important parts
of the auditing process, but should not become aims and ends in
themselves when weighing whether an algorithmic system under
audit is ethically acceptable for release. Taking metrics measured in
isolation risks recapitulating the abstraction error that [69] point
out, "To treat fairness and justice as terms that have meaningful
application to technology separate from a social context is there-
fore to make a category error, or as we posit here, an abstraction
error." What we consider data is already an interpretation, highly
subjective and contested [23]. Metrics must be understood in re-
lation to the engineering context in which they were developed
and the social context into which they will be deployed. During the
interviews, auditors should capture and pay attention to what falls
outside the measurements and metrics, and to render explicit the
assumptions and values the metrics apprehend [75]. For example,
the decision about whether to prioritize the false positive rate over
false negative rate (precision/recall) is a question about values and
cannot be answered without stating the values of the organization,
team or even engineer within the given development context.
4.4 The Artifact Collection Stage
Note that the collection of these artifacts advances adherence to
the declared AI principles of the organization on "Responsibility &
Accountability" and "Transparency".
In this stage, we identify and collect all the required documenta-
tion from the product development process, in order to prioritize
opportunities for testing. Often this implies a record of data and
model dynamics though application-based systems can include
other product development artifacts such as design documents and
reviews, in addition to systems architecture diagrams and other
implementation planning documents and retrospectives.
At times documentation can be distributed across different teams
and stakeholders, or is missing altogether. In certain cases, the au-
ditor is in a position to enforce retroactive documentation require-
ments on the product team, or craft documents themselves.
The model card for the smile detection model is the template
model card from the original paper [48]. A hypothetical datasheet
for this system is filled out using studies on the CelebA dataset,
with which the smile detector is built [44, 47]. In the model card, we
identify potential for misuse if smiling is confused for positive affect.
From the datasheet for the CelebA dataset, we see that although the
provided binary gender labels seem balanced for this dataset (58.1%
female, 42% male), other demographic details are quite skewed
(77.8% aged 0-45, 22.1% aged over 46 and 14.2% lighter-skinned,
85.8% darker-skinned)[47].
The key artifact from auditors during this stage is the audit check-
list, one method of verifying that all documentation pre-requisites
are provided in order to commence the audit. Those pre-requisites
can include model and data transparency documentation.
4.4.1 Artifact: Design Checklist. This checklist is a method of tak-
ing inventory of all the expected documentation to have been gen-
erated from the product development cycle. It ensures that the full
scope of expected product processes and that the corresponding
documentation required to be completed before the audit review
can begin are finished. This is also a procedural evaluation of the
development process for the system, to ensure that appropriate
actions were pursued throughout system development ahead of the
evaluation of the final system outcome.
4.4.2 Artifacts: Datasheets and Model Cards. Two recent standards
can be leveraged to create auditable documentation, model cards
and datasheets [24, 48]. Both model cards and datasheets are im-
portant tools toward making algorithmic development and the
algorithms themselves more auditable, with the aim of anticipating
risks and harms with using artificial intelligence systems. Ideally,
these artifacts should be developed and/or collected by product
stakeholders during the course of system development.
To clarify the intended use cases of artificial intelligence models
and minimize their usage in contexts for which they are not well
suited, Mitchell et al. recommend that released models be accompa-
nied by documentation detailing their performance characteristics
[48], called a model card. This should include information about
how the model was built, what assumptions were made during
development, and what type of model behavior might be experi-
enced by different cultural, demographic or phenotypic groups. A
Closing the AI Accountability Gap:
Defining an End-to-End Framework for Internal Algorithmic Auditing FAT* ’20, January 27–30, 2020, Barcelona, Spain
model card is also extremely useful for internal development pur-
poses to make clear to stakeholders details about trained models
that are included in larger software pipelines, which are parts of
internal organizational dynamics, which are then parts of larger
sociotechnical logics and processes. A robust model card is key to
documenting the intended use of the model as well as information
about the evaluation data, model scope and risks, and what might
be affecting model performance.
Model cards are intended to complement "Datasheets for Datasets"
[24]. Datasheets for machine learning datasets are derived by anal-
ogy from the electronics hardware industry, where a datasheet for
an electronics component describes its operating characteristics,
test results, and recommended uses. A critical part of the datasheet
covers the data collection process. This set of questions are intended
to provide consumers of the dataset with the information they need
to make informed decisions about using the dataset: what mecha-
nisms or procedures were used to collect the data? Was any ethical
review process conducted? Does the dataset relate to people?
This documentation feeds into the auditors’ assessment process.
4.5 The Testing Stage
This stage is where the majority of the auditing team’s testing
activity is done—when the auditors execute a series of tests to gauge
the compliance of the system with the prioritized ethical values of
the organization. Auditors engage with the system in various ways,
and produce a series of artifacts to demonstrate the performance of
the analyzed system at the time of the audit. Additionally, auditors
review the documentation collected from the previous stage and
begin to make assessments of the likelihood of system failures to
comply with declared principles.
High variability in approach is likely during this stage, as the
tests that need to be executed change dramatically depending on
organizational and system context. Testing should be based on a
risk prioritization from the FMEA.
For the smile detector, we might employ counterfactual adver-
sarial examples designed to confuse the model and find problematic
failure modes derived from the FMEA. For the child prediction
model, we test performance on a selection of diverse user profiles.
These profiles can also be treated for variables that correlate with
vulnerable groups to test whether the model has learned biased
associations with race or SES.
For the ethical risk analysis chart, we look at the principles and
realize that there are immediate risks to the "Privacy" principle—
with one case involving juvenile data, which is sensitive, and the
other involving face data, a biometric. This is also when it becomes
clear that in the smiling booth case, there is disproportionate per-
formance for certain underrepresented user subgroups, thus jeop-
ardizing the "Justice, Fariness & Non-Discrimination" principle.
The main artifacts from this stage of the auditing process are
the results of tests such as adversarial probing of the system and
an ethical risk analysis chart.
4.5.1 Artifact: Adversarial Testing . Adversarial testing is a common
approach to finding vulnerabilities in both pre-release and post-
launch technology, for example in privacy and security testing [6].
In general, adversarial testing attempts to simulate what a hostile
actor might do to gain access to a system, or to push the limits of
the system into edge case or unstable behavior to elicit very-low
probability but high-severity failures.
In this process, direct non-statistical testing uses tailored inputs
to the model to see if they result in undesirable outputs. These
inputs can be motivated by an intersectional analysis, for exam-
ple where an ML system might produce unfair outputs based on
demographic and phenotypic groups that might combine in non-
additive ways to produce harm, or over time recapitulate harmful
stereotypes or reinforce unjust social dynamics (for example, in
the form of opportunity denial). This is distinct from adversarially
attacking a model with human-imperceptible pixel manipulations
to trick the model into misidentifying previously learned outputs
[28], but these approaches can be complementary. This approach
is more generally defined—encompassing a range of input options
to try in an active attempt to fool the system and incite identified
failure modes from the FMEA.
Internal adversarial testing prior to launch can reveal unexpected
product failures before they can impact the real world. Addition-
ally, proactive adversarial testing of already-launched products can
be a best practice for lifecycle management of released systems.
The FMEA should be updated with these results, and the relative
changes to risks assessed.
4.5.2 Artifact: Ethical Risk Analysis Chart. The ethical risk analysis
chart considers the combination of the likelihood of a failure and
the severity of a failure to define the importance of the risk. Highly
likely and dangerous risks are considered the most high-priority
threats. Each risk is assigned a severity indication of "high", "mid"
and "low" depending on their combination of these features.
Failure likelihood is estimated by considering the occurrence of
certain failures during the adversarial testing of the system and the
severity of the risk is identified in earlier stages, from informative
processes such as the social impact assessment and ethnographic
interviews.
4.6 The Reflection Stage
This phase of the audit is the more reflective stage, when the results
of the tests at the execution stage are analyzed in juxtaposition
with the ethical expectations clarified in the audit scoping. Auditors
update and formalize the final risk analysis in the context of test
results, outlining specific principles that may be jeopardized by the
AI system upon deployment. This phase will reflect on product de-
cisions and design recommendations that could be made following
the audit results.
Additionally, key artifacts at this stage may include a mitigation
plan or action plan, jointly developed by the audit and engineering
teams, that outlines prioritized risks and test failures that the engi-
neering team is in a position to mitigate for future deployments or
for a future version of the audited system.
For the smile detection algorithm, the decision could be to train
a new version of the model on more diverse data before considering
deployment, and add more samples of underrepresented popula-
tions in CelebA to the training data. It could be decided that the
use case does not necessarily define affect, but treats smiling as a
favourable photo pose. Design choices for other parts of the product
outside the model should be considered—for instance, an opt-in
functionality with user permissions required on the screen before
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applying the model-controlled function, and the default being that
the model-controlled trigger is disabled. There could also be an
included disclaimer on privacy, assuring users of safe practices for
face data storage and consent. Once these conditions are met, Com-
pany X could be confident to greenlight developing this product
for the client.
For the child abuse detection model—this is a more complex
decision. Given the ethical considerations involved, the project
may be stalled or even cancelled, requiring further inquiry into the
ethics of the use case, and the capability of the team to complete
the mitigation plan required to deploy an algorithm in such a high
risk scenario.
4.6.1 Artifact: Algorithmic Use-related Risk Analysis and FMEA.
The risk analysis should be informed by the social impact assess-
ment and known issues with similar models. Following Leveson’s
work on safety engineering [42], we stress that careful attention
must be paid to the distinction between the designers’ mental mod-
els of the artificial intelligence system and the user’s mental model.
The designers’ mental models are an idealization of the artificial
intelligence system before the model is released. Significant differ-
ences exist between this ideal model and how the actual system will
behave or be used once deployed. This may be due to many factors,
such as distributional drift [41] where the training and test set dis-
tributions differ from the real-world distribution, or intentional or
unintentional misuse of the model for purposes other than those for
which it was designed. Reasonable and foreseeable misuse of the
model should be anticipated by the designer. Therefore, the user’s
mental model of the system should be anticipated and taken into
consideration. Large gaps between the intended and actual uses of
algorithms have been found in contexts such as criminal justice
and web journalism [12].
This adds complexity to anticipated hazards and risks, neverthe-
less these should be documented where possible. Christin points
out “the importance of studying the practices, uses, and implemen-
tations surrounding algorithmic technologies. Intellectually, this
involves establishing new exchanges between literatures that may
not usually interact, such as critical data studies, the sociology of
work, and organizational analysis”. We propose that known use-
related issues with deployed systems be taken into account during
the design stage. The format of the risk analysis can be variable
depending on context, and there are many valuable templates to be
found in Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (Section 3.1.3) framing
and other risk analysis tools in finance and medical deployments.
4.6.2 Artifact: Remediation and Risk Mitigation Plan. After the au-
dit is completed and findings are presented to the leadership and
product teams, it is important to develop a plan for remediating
these problems. The goal is to drive down the risk of ethical con-
cerns or potential negative social impacts to the extent reasonably
practicable. This plan can be reviewed by the audit team and lead-
ership to better inform deployment decisions.
For the concerns raised in any audit against ethical values, a
technical team will want to know: what is the threshold for ac-
ceptable performance? If auditors discover, for example, unequal
classifier performance across subgroups, how close to parity is nec-
essary to say the classifier is acceptable? In safety engineering, a
risk threshold is usually defined under which the risk is considered
tolerable. Though a challenging problem, similar standards could
be established and developed in the ethics space as well.
4.6.3 Artifact: Algorithmic Design History File. Inspired by the con-
cept of the design history file from the medical device industry [77],
we propose an algorithmic design history file (ADHF) which would
collect all the documentation from the activities outlined above
related to the development of the algorithm. It should point to the
documents necessary to demonstrate that the product or model
was developed in accordance with an organization’s ethical values,
and that the benefits of the product outweigh any risks identified
in the risk analysis process.
This design history file would form the basis of the final audit
report, which is a written evaluation by the organization’s audit
team. The ADHF should assist with an audit trail, enabling the
reconstruction of key decisions and events during the development
of the product. The algorithmic report would then be a distillation
and summary of the ADHF.
4.6.4 Artifact: Algorithmic Audit Summary Report. The report ag-
gregates all key audit artifacts, technical analyses and documenta-
tion, putting this in one accessible location for review. This audit
report should be compared qualitatively and quantitatively to the
expectations outlined in the given ethical objectives and any corre-
sponding engineering requirements.
5 LIMITATIONS OF INTERNAL AUDITS
Internal auditors necessarily share an organizational interest with
the target of the audit. While it is important to maintain an indepen-
dent and objective viewpoint during the execution of an audit, we
awknowledge that this is challenging. The audit is never isolated
from the practices and people conducting the audit, just as artifi-
cial intelligence systems are not independent of their developers
or of the larger sociotechnical system. Audits are not unified or
monolithic processes with an objective "view from nowhere", but
must be understood as a "patchwork of coupled procedures, tools
and calculative processes" [74]. To avoid audits becoming simply
acts of reputation management for an organization, the auditors
should be mindful of their own and the organizations’ biases and
viewpoints. Although long-standing internal auditing practices for
quality assurance in the financial, aviation, chemical, food, and phar-
maceutical industries have been shown to be an effective means of
controlling risk in these industries [76], the regulatory dynamics in
these industries suggest that internal audits are only one important
aspect of a broader system of required quality checks and balances.
6 CONCLUSION
AI has the potential to benefit the whole of society, however there
is currently an inequitable risk distribution such that those who
already face patterns of structural vulnerability or bias dispropor-
tionately bear the costs and harms of many of these systems. Fair-
ness, justice and ethics require that those bearing these risks are
given due attention and that organizations that build and deploy
artificial intelligence systems internalize and proactively address
these social risks as well, being seriously held to account for system
compliance to declared ethical principles.
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